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The Right to Two
Criminal Defense Lawyers
by Bruce A. Green*
I. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
"What can courts, legislators, or criminal defense lawyers themselves
do to seriously change criminal defense practice in a manner that
significantly benefits criminal defendants and promotes justice?" That
question was posed to the participants in an August 2017 SEALS
discussion group and Mercer University School of Law's 2017 Symposium
on "disruptive innovation in criminal defense."1 The implied premise of
the question is that aspects of criminal defense should be fixed or can be
improved-and in radical ways.
The question of disruptive innovation provides an occasion for
identifying deficiencies and weaknesses in contemporary criminal
defense practice, and because defense lawyers do not work in isolation,
deficiencies in the criminal process as it relates to criminal defense
* Louis Stein Chair and Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law. Princeton University (A.B., 1978); Columbia University School
of Law (J.D., 1981).
1. A disruptive innovation has been defined as "a product or service that most initially
see as inferior-until successive improvements end up displacing established products or
entire industries." Joan C. Williams, Disruptive Innovation: New Models of Legal Practice,
67 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4-5 (2015). A possible example in the context of the delivery of legal
services is the use of machine learning technologies that can displace humans in document
review or legal research to significantly lower costs. See SHANNON SPANGLER, DISRUPTIVE
INNOVATION IN THE LEGAL SERVICES MARKET: Is REAL CHANGE COMING TO THE BUSINESS
OF LAW, OR WILL THE STATUS Quo REIGN? (2014) (ebook), https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2014aba annuallwritten-materials/
disrupttive innovation.authcheckdam.pdf. Although the term is ordinarily applied in
business contexts, some believe that the legal industry is facing imminent disruption. See,
e.g., Clayton M. Christensen et al., Consulting on the Cusp of Disruption, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Oct. 2013, at 12 ("The leaders of the legal services industry would once have held that the
franchise of the top firms was virtually unassailable, enshrined in practice and tradition-
and, in many countries, in law. And yet disruption of these firms is undeniably under
way.").
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representation. The question presents a challenge to think "outside the
box"-even if unrealistically, fancifully, idealistically, or hopefully.
In that spirit, this Article proposes the following innovation: Criminal
defendants who have a right to appointed counsel should be assigned two
defense lawyers who would interact with each other, the client, and
others, but who would serve essentially different functions.
While the typical legal academic writing starts with a problem and
builds up to a proposed solution, this one reverses the order. It begins in
Part II by outlining the proposal to divide the criminal defense function
between two lawyers. Then, Parts III and IV identify the problems
addressed by, and the anticipated objections to, this innovation. Part V
concludes with some thoughts about the utility of the analysis, fanciful
though it may initially seem to be.
II. A PROPOSED DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION: A RIGHT TO TWO LAWYERS
This Article's proposed disruptive innovation is that indigent
defendants be assigned two lawyers-each of whom would have primary
responsibility for different functions. The "settlement lawyer" would
take the lead outside judicial proceedings, undertaking responsibility for
the counseling and negotiating roles. The "trial lawyer" would be the
principal advocate. These roles correspond to the different but
interconnected processes-plea bargaining and trial-by which most
criminal prosecutions in the United States are resolved.
The proposal is "innovative" only to a degree. The idea that two or more
lawyers would represent a client in the same matter is hardly novel.
Lawyers commonly serve as co-counsel in litigation, particularly in civil
litigation and white-collar criminal litigation. The criminal defense
lawyers who served as co-counsel on O.J. Simpson's successful murder
defense-the so-called "dream team"-prominently displayed the utility
of collaboration among co-counsel. 2
Particularly in the work of law firms, collaboration among lawyers is
the norm, not the exception-indeed, collaboration among lawyers with
different expertise (and, often, different hourly billing rates) may be a
law firm's selling point. 3 For example, a senior lawyer (often the
"relationship partner") may assume ultimate responsibility for the
representation, and for communicating with the client while delegating
2. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF His LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON
(1997).
3. See John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 999 (2011)
(finding that in selecting counsel, corporate clients generally focus on the quality of a law
firm's teams and departments, rather than individual lawyers).
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much of the other work. Or a senior lawyer will take primary
responsibility for certain important tasks-for example, counseling the
client, settlement negotiations, and courtroom appearances-and
oversee subordinate lawyers who undertake various other tasks, such as
legal research, drafting, and depositions.
Co-counsel relationships among private lawyers in different firms are
also common.4 For example, two solo practitioners may join forces on a
large matter, or a lawyer conducting most of the representation
independently may bring another lawyer into the matter for a discrete
task, such as to draft motions or to consult on an issue where the second
lawyer has particular expertise. There are many other ways in which
work and responsibility can be divided among co-counsel. 5
Perhaps the nearest analogue to this Article's proposal is the
occasional employment of "settlement counsel" in civil litigation.6
However, the settlement lawyer in the criminal context would have a
larger counseling function and would have greater independence. One
might also analogize to the British criminal justice system, where
indigent defendants are assigned both a barrister, who conducts the trial,
and a solicitor, who consults with the defendant and "instructs" the
solicitor.7
The difference here is in how the roles would be divided. Unlike the
British barrister, the U.S. trial lawyer would be responsible for pretrial
investigation. In the U.S. criminal context, courts occasionally appoint a
second lawyer for the purpose of advising the defendant whether to waive
4. See Stephen C. Sieberson, Two Lawyers, One Client, and the Duty to Communicate:
A Gap in Rules 1.2 and 1.4, 11 U.N.H. L. REV. 27, 29-31 (2013) (describing different co-
counsel relationships).
5. See, e.g., AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK FUND, INC., ET. AL., PUBLIC
SERVICE IN A TIME OF CRISIS: A REPORT AND RETROSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL COMMUNITY'S
RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 11-12 (2004), https://www.city
barjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/public-service-time-crisis.pdf (discussing
that following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, lawyer-
facilitators met with clients to ascertain their needs and collaborated with other volunteer
lawyers with the appropriate expertise).
6. For discussions of the use of settlement counsel in civil litigation, see William F.
Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 367, 375-80 (1999);
John Lande, The Movement Towards Early Case Handling in Courts and Private Dispute
Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 83-94 (2008); Gary Mendelsohn, Lawyers as
Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139, 143-50 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Nadia Shamsi, The Search For Truth: A Comparative Look at Criminal
Jury Trials in the United States and England, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 126, 144
(2016) (noting that the specialized education and experiences of barristers and solicitors
improves their ability to advocate effectively as compared to American attorneys).
2018] 677
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the primary lawyer's conflict of interest,8 but this is a far more limited
counseling role than contemplated here for the lawyer who is not the trial
advocate.
In the proposed two-lawyer criminal-defense scheme, the settlement
and trial lawyers would interact with the defendant in different ways.
The settlement lawyer would interview the defendant to determine his
concerns and preferences and to gather information relevant to a plea
bargain or another negotiated disposition of the case. Based on
information from the client, the trial lawyer, and the prosecutor, the
settlement lawyer would advise the defendant about his options and
negotiate with the prosecutor regarding the disposition. The trial lawyer,
in the advocacy role, would interview the defendant to gather information
relevant to a defense, seek discovery from the prosecutor by informal and
formal means, conduct pretrial litigation and, if the case is not otherwise
resolved, represent the defendant at trial.
The two lawyers would interact with each other as co-counsel. In order
to advise the defendant effectively about the prospects of an acquittal at
trial, which would ordinarily be an important consideration in deciding
whether to plead guilty, the settlement lawyer would have to learn from
the trial lawyer what has transpired in the investigation, trial
preparation, and pretrial phase of the case, and how the trial lawyer
evaluates prospective outcomes if the case is tried. If trial counsel has to
make arguments regarding pretrial release or sentencing, he may benefit
from information gleaned by the settlement lawyer in the course of
counseling the client. The settlement lawyer would also share other
information received from the client or the prosecutor that might be
relevant to the trial lawyer's investigation and advocacy. The two lawyers
would be available to toss around ideas and to make suggestions to each
other and, where necessary, to fill in for each other, as in other co-counsel
relationships.
The two lawyers would each interact with the prosecutor, but
generally in different ways. The settlement lawyer would have the
principal responsibility, where authorized by the client, to solicit a plea
offer and to negotiate any disposition of the case. This could include
making a pitch for why mitigating factors justify leniency. Based on
information from the trial lawyer, the settlement lawyer might also
argue why the facts of the case, or the possibility of an acquittal at trial,
justify a more favorable disposition. The settlement lawyer's relationship
with the prosecutor need not be adversarial and, where advantageous,
could be cooperative and cordial since leniency for the defendant could be
8. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzariello, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179314, at *5-6, 6
n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2015).
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put forth in an appeal to the prosecutor's presumed interest in "seeking
justice."9 The trial lawyer, meanwhile, could maintain a more traditional
adversarial relationship with the prosecution in the course of preparing
and defending the case.
The two lawyers would also interact differently with the court. As
noted, the trial lawyer would play the principal advocacy role. This would
include making arguments about pretrial release, filing discovery and
other pretrial motions, conducting the defense if the case goes to trial,
and making any sentencing arguments. Insofar as the defendant opts to
plead guilty, the settlement lawyer would have a responsibility to ensure
that the decision is well-informed. Ordinarily, it might be unnecessary
for settlement counsel to join trial counsel at guilty plea proceedings,
which can be largely pro forma once the defendant has made an informed
decision to plead guilty. But the settlement lawyer would appear in court
when beneficial, such as when the defendant remains unresolved and
needs advice in the courtroom, when necessary to raise questions about
the defendant's capacity to plead guilty, or to interject other concerns,
including the inadequacy of the pretrial investigation or of pretrial
discovery, that impair the defendant's ability to make an adequately
informed decision.
A right to two lawyers-like other disruptive innovations-would have
to be established and developed over time. Initially, the concept would
have to be proven. Public defenders' offices might initially experiment by
pairing their own lawyers to serve in the respective roles. In jurisdictions
with multiple public defenders' offices, lawyers from different offices
might be paired. If the concept proves promising, these offices might
expand the experiment while making changes to eliminate problems and
improve the co-counsel relationship. It would make sense to begin the
experiment in felony cases, and perhaps in more serious felony cases.
Eventually, if proven successful, the concept could be implemented by
courts with authority over indigent defense systems or by legislatures
establishing laws governing indigent defense. Understandings regarding
the respective lawyers' roles and responsibilities would be refined over
time.
9. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2130-31 (1998) (describing plea bargaining where the prosecutors assume a quasi-
judicial role); Rodney J. Uphoff, Misjudging: On Misjudging and Its Implications for
Criminal Defendants, Their Lawyers, and the Criminal Justice System, 7 NEV. L. REV. 521,
535 (2007) (describing how good defense lawyers seek to persuade prosecutors to drop
charges or give defendants the benefit of diversion in particular cases). Regarding
prosecutors' duty to see justice in general, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt.
1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999).
2018] 679
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III. WHY Two LAWYERS ARE BETTER THAN ONE
The quality of criminal defense matters. In some cases, it matters to
the outcome for the defendant: the quality of the defense can influence
whether the prosecutor pursues or drops criminal charges or diverts the
case to a problem-solving court; whether the defendant is acquitted or
convicted at trial; or the length of the defendant's sentence or the
harshness of other consequences of a conviction.10 Wholly apart from the
ultimate outcome, the quality of criminal defense matters to whether
criminal defendants understand what is happening to them during the
criminal process, whether they perceive that they have a lawyer on their
side whom they can trust, and whether they can make well-advised
decisions. From the public's perspective, the legitimacy of the criminal
process turns in part on whether those accused of a crime receive
competent representation.
There is voluminous literature concerning the inadequacies of indigent
criminal defense representation and its consequences." The most
frequent criticisms are that, in many or most jurisdictions, indigent
criminal defense is underfunded, 12 and consequently, public defenders'
10. See, e.g., JAMES M. ANDERSON & PAUL HEATON, MEASURING THE EFFECT OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL ON HOMICIDE CASE OUTCOMES (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl
/nij/grants/241158.pdf (finding that in Philadelphia homicide cases, public defenders
achieve better results than appointed counsel with respect to both acquittal rates and
sentencing); THOMAS H. COHEN, WHO'S BETTER AT DEFENDING CRIMINALS? DOES TYPE OF
DEFENSE ATTORNEY MATTER IN TERMS OF PRODUCING FAVORABLE CASE OUTCOMES? (2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1876474 (finding that private lawyers
and public defenders achieve better results than appointed counsel with respect to both
acquittal rates and sentencing).
11. See, e.g., Sheila Martin Berry, "Bad Lawyering"- How Defense Attorneys Help
Convict the Innocent, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 487, 502 (2003) ("Innocent people continue to be
convicted every day, and bad lawyering in every form facilitates many of these
convictions."); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) ("Poor people accused of
capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills, resources, and
commitment to handle such serious matters . . . . It is not the facts of the crime, but the
quality of legal representation, that distinguishes this case, where the death penalty was
imposed, from many similar cases, where it was not.").
12. See, e.g., Jessica Hafkin, A Lawyer's Ethical Obligation To Refuse New Cases or To
Withdraw from Existing Ones When Faced with Excessive Caseloads That Prevent Him from
Providing Competent and Diligent Representation to Indigent Defendants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 657, 658 (2007) ("[M]ost state indigent defense systems across the country are
consistently operating in crisis mode, barely able to function and increasingly unable to
handle the number of cases that cycle through those systems each day."); Richard Klein,
The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 658 (1986); Ronald F.
Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90
IOWA L. REV. 219, 221 (2004) ("Year after year, in study after study, observers find
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caseloads are too heavy for lawyers to give cases and clients the time they
need.13 This is irrefutably a dire problem, and it risks dwarfing all others.
Wholly apart from the adequacy of funding, critics have targeted the
manner in which indigent defense is funded and structured,14 the
manner in which public defenders' offices allocate scarce resources, 15 and
the culture of public defenders' offices.1 6 Other perceived deficiencies,
which may or may not be rooted in how indigent criminal defense is
funded and structured, include that (1) some defense lawyers "burn out"
remarkably poor defense lawyering that remains unchanged by this constitutional doctrine,
and they point to lack of funding as the major obstacle to quality defense lawyering.").
13. See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1035-36 (2006) (discussing examples of
public defender offices which consistently provide inadequate defense, as well as entire
indigent defense systems that have been "viewed as essentially incapable of preserving
fundamental constitutional rights"); Peter A. Joy, Boots on the Ground: The Ethical and
Professional Battles of Public Defenders: Ensuring the Ethical Representation of Clients in
the Face of Excessive Caseloads, 75 Mo. L. REV. 771, 771 (2010) ("In state after state, public
defenders face overwhelming caseloads that inevitably make quality legal representation
for clients much more of a dream than a reality."); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened
to Access to Justice?, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 894 (2009) (footnote omitted) ("Annual
caseloads for public defenders can range between 500 and 900 felony matters or over 2,000
misdemeanors. Such workloads vastly exceed the standards of the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice, which set ceilings of 150 felonies and 400
misdemeanors.").
14. See, e.g., David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public Defense: A Call for
Independence, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2017) (arguing that federal funding for federal
defenders should be entrusted to an independent agency, separate from the federal
judiciary); Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice
for All Criminal Defendants, 73 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client
Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 505 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Irene Oritseweyinme Joe, Systematizing Public Defender Rationing, 93
DENv. L. REV. 389 (2016).
16. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, Painting the Roses Red: Confessions of a Recovering
Public Defender, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 371 (2015).
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or otherwise lack motivation,' 7 (2) some are inadequately trained, 8 (3)
some cannot relate to their clients or win their clients' trust, 9 (4) some
give in to pressure from the judges, legislators, or executive officials
controling their appointment, 20 and (5) some focus almost exclusively on
the penal outcome of cases (the length of prison sentences) to the
exclusion of the "whole person"-such as a defendant's underlying
mental health issues, a defendant's interrelated legal and social
challenges, and the nonpenal implications of a conviction. 21 Scholars and
17. See Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (1993) ('The phenomenon of burnout is
widespread and can be particularly troubling when it undermines our commitment to the
representation of criminal defendants, which in our justice system is a constitutional, if not
a moral, imperative. The loss of public defenders to burnout threatens the ability of the
system to fulfill its commitment to these ideals."); Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not
Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2004) (describing young lawyers who left indigent
defense practices because "they were burned out, worn out, emotionally spent"); Abbe Smith
& William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 532-33
(1999) ("Public defenders burn out for many reasons. The offices in which public defenders
work can be dreary, resources for defenders can be woefully inadequate, and public
defenders are paid substantially less than many of their law school classmates. Some public
defenders get tired of the constant pressure to plea bargain cases, and some get tired of
difficult and demanding clients. Others get 'sick of representing so many bad people."').
18. See generally JOEL M. SCHUMM, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE
SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED 18-24 (2012) (discussing the need for performance guidelines
and training for indigent defenders).
19. Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had
a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 4, 6 (1971) (observing that criminal
defendants sometimes regard their attorney as a "surrogate of the prosecutor ... rather
than as their own representative"); Abbe Smith, Promoting Justice Through
Interdisciplinary Teaching, Practice, and Scholarship: The Difference in Criminal Defense
and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83, 121 (2003) (observing that "the
struggle to obtain, and hold on to a client's trust can be stressful and tiresome").
20. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2480 (2004) ("Judges and clerks put pressure on defense counsel (especially
public defenders) to be pliable in bargaining. Repeat defense counsel often must yield to
this pressure in order to avoid judicial reprisals against clients and perhaps to continue to
receive court appointments."); Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in
Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1789-91 (2016) (discussing indigent defense
lawyers' lack of independence).
21. See M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideon's Gold: How
Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. 2358, 2371-75 (2013) (discussing
representation of mentally ill and intellectually challenged clients); Mark H. Moore,
Alternative Strategies for Public Defenders and Assigned Counsel, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 83, 104-09 (2004) (discussing representation of the "whole" client as an alternative
to traditional defense representation); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's
Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1504-06 (2003) (discussing "holistic" defense
lawyering); Janet Levine, Criminal Justice Section, ABA Resolution and Report 107C, at 3
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practitioners have proposed innovative ways (aside from increased
funding) to address the problems of indigent defense, 22 including ways of
freeing up resources. 23
This Article does not attempt to tackle all of the problems of indigent
defense, or even the most serious problems. But its proposal to divide
defense representation between two lawyers, as a potential disruptive
innovation, provides an occasion to consider eight problems associated
with indigent defense other than underfunding and excessive caseloads.
The problems addressed here are not necessarily caused only by
underfunding or entirely solved by increased funding.
First, the division of roles would address one of the most frequent
criticisms of indigent criminal defense-namely that defense lawyers
often encourage defendants to plead guilty without first conducting the
investigation and preparation necessary to ascertain the likelihood of
acquittal and to preserve the possibility of a trial defense. 24 It is assumed
that competent investigation must ordinarily be undertaken before
advising the defendant to plead guilty. 25 There are exceptions where a
(Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/criminal jus
tice/ABAResolutionl07c.authcheckdam.pdf ("[T]he real calculus of criminal defense
strategy entails much more than a binary guilt/innocence equation and encompasses many
more variables including likely penalties and punishments, the collateral damage on family
members, and rehabilitative goals."). The Georgia Justice Project in Atlanta is among the
defenders' offices known to take a broader approach. See Kyung M. Lee, Comment,
Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right
to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 409-15 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants:
Theory and Practice, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505 (2015) (advocating for allowing criminal
defendants to select counsel).
23. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis
in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316 (2013) (maintaining
that "smart on crime" reforms will reduce criminal defense costs); Erica J. Hashimoto, The
Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2017) (proposing that
states conserve resources for felony defense by limiting the statutory right to counsel to
misdemeanor cases where, because there is a risk of imprisonment, there is a constitutional
right to counsel, and by reducing the number of misdemeanor statutes and prosecutions
where imprisonment is a possibility).
24. See, e.g., Mary Sue Bacjus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney
Bias and the Rush to the Plea, 65 KAN. L. REV. 271 (2016).
25. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("[C]ounsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary"); Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness:
Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333,
340-47 (2013); CeCelia Valentine, Meet 'Em and Plead 'Em: Is This the Best Practice?, THE
CHAMPION, June 2013 (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington,
D.C.), at 18, https://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=28953.
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quick resolution may be justified,26 but more often, when criminal
defense lawyers encourage speedy pleas, they do so as a way of managing
their caseloads, 27 in response to outside pressure from judges or others,
or for other reasons unrelated to the defendant's best interests. "Meet 'em
and plead 'em" is said to be standard practice in some jurisdictions. 28 The
defendant may be disadvantaged as a result because the decision to plead
guilty is not adequately informed and may be improvident, or because
the defendant loses the negotiating leverage created by a credible threat
to defend the case at trial.29
A settlement lawyer who has no responsibility for the trial will not
have the same incentive to encourage quick guilty pleas or to encourage
guilty pleas at all. While this lawyer's workload may be somewhat
reduced if the defendant pleads guilty, the self-interest of the settlement
lawyer will be far less than the criminal defense lawyer in the current
regime for whom a guilty plea avoids pretrial investigation, motion
practice, and potentially a lengthy and undesired trial.30 Settlement
counsel would be in a position to offer advice that is less self-interested,
and therefore more reliable and credible, regarding whether to plead
guilty or to pursue or accept a disposition other than trial. At the same
time, the trial lawyer would not have an incentive to shirk while awaiting
a guilty plea, because that lawyer's income would derive entirely from
time spent investigating and preparing for trial or in conducting trials.
26. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (observing that defendants in criminal court often plead
guilty to avoid the burden of having to return to court).
27. See Andrea Woods, The Undersigned Attorney Hereby Certifies: Ensuring
Reasonable Caseloads for Washington Defenders and Clients, 89 WASH. L. REV. 217, 229-
32 (2014) (describing efforts to cap public defenders' caseloads in order to lower the
occurrence of plea bargaining).
28. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to Plea, 65
KAN. L. REV. 271, 295 (2016) ("The practice of pleading out a client quickly and with little
investigation or deliberation or even communication has been dubbed, 'meet 'em and plead
'em."').
29. See, e.g., Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias, supra note 28, at 275 (noting that even in
the case of guilty defendants, "[c]riminal defendants likely underestimate the opportunity
costs associated [with] plea deals-namely, giving up the right to force the prosecutor to
prove her case ... . [T]he 'discount' offered with a plea is often close to what the defendant
would receive at trial anyway, in which case the defendant would fare best by going to
trial.").
30. For a discussion of the potential role of self-interest in the work of criminal defense
attorneys, see Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy
for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 351 (2013) ("[A] lawyer
whose primary focus is on his or her personal self-interest in deciding how to represent
clients can be expected to engage in virtually no investigation on cases.").
684 [Vol. 69
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Second, the assignment of two lawyers would make each other more
accountable. Like a British solicitor, the settlement lawyer would be able
to serve as the defendant's agent or intermediary in evaluating,
overseeing, and explaining the trial lawyer's work. As the client's
intermediary in dealing with trial counsel, settlement counsel would
have the legal sophistication to evaluate the quality of trial counsel's
investigation, motion practice, and trial preparation and could intervene
when trial counsel does not appear to be conducting necessary and
competent work. The trial lawyer, in interacting with the settlement
lawyer and forming views of whether that lawyer is diligently performing
the counseling and negotiating functions, could serve a comparable
function. The lawyers' respective roles would be analogous to corporate
in-house counsel retaining and overseeing outside counsel to handle
litigation or to the occasional role of a general outside counsel for a party
retaining a litigator.3 1 In the medical profession, the role might also be
analogized to that of a primary care physician interacting with a patient's
surgeon.
This oversight function would fill a significant regulatory gap.
Complaints about the quality of criminal defense lawyers are common.32
But it is difficult to make defense lawyers better, in part because of the
dearth of meaningful oversight, especially for defense lawyers not
receiving ongoing training and supervision in public defenders' offices. 33
Although criminal defendants are technically the principals in the
attorney-client relationship, they do not have a realistic ability to
31. See Sieberson, Two Lawyers, supra note 4, at 31 (noting "the role of in-house
counsel who monitors the work of an outside attorney" and "the client's retention of an
outside firm to monitor and coordinate the efforts of other outside firms"). For another
context in which one lawyer is obligated to oversee another's work, see Scott R. Larson, P.C.
v. Grinnan, 2017 Colo. App. LEXIS 766, at *14-19 (June 15, 2017) (holding that as a
condition of certain fee sharing arrangements among lawyers, one lawyer must assume
"ethical responsibility" and malpractice liability for the other's work).
32. See, e.g., Bruce Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IOwA L. REV. 433, 491 (1993) ("In the states where assigned lawyers do not
necessarily specialize in the defense of criminal cases, the assignment of unqualified
attorneys appears, by virtually all accounts, to be a common occurrence."); J. Gregory
Mermelstein, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: Toward a Uniform Framework for
Review, 50 Mo. L. REV. 651, 651 (1985) ("Surveys indicate that judges believe at least one
tenth of the lawyers in practice today are ineffective and harmful to their clients' cases.")
(citing Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 634 n.7 (1980)).
33. Adele Bernhard, Raising the Bar: Standards-Based Training, Supervision, and
Evaluation, 75 Mo. L. REV. 831, 848 (2010) ("[L]ack of oversight is consistently cited as one
of the most pressing structural defects in indigent defense systems."); Bruce A. Green,
Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169,
1171 (2003).
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ascertain, evaluate, and direct their lawyers' investigative and
preparatory work. For better or worse, they are at their defense lawyers'
mercy. Trial judges are also poorly situated to meaningfully oversee the
quality of defense lawyers' pretrial efforts, and they typically do not
credit defendants' complaints. 34 Jennifer Laurin highlighted the problem
of defense lawyers' lack of accountability and has proposed accumulating
and analyzing data about their work as one way to promote
accountability.3 5 The proposal here-to have each lawyer oversee the
other-is lower-tech and more old-fashioned. Lawyers would be in a
position to critique their counterparts' work, to encourage those who fall
short to work harder or to undertake necessary study and training, and
to present credible complaints to the court when those efforts are plainly
deficient.
Third, the proposal would address problems caused by the isolation
and insularity of criminal defense lawyers, many of whom are solo
practitioners working alone on their cases.36 Generally, one can assume
that two heads are better than one. Particularly where the trial lawyer
does not otherwise discuss the case with colleagues, there is a risk of
misjudging the case, overlooking problems, and missing options. The
quality of defense work would be improved if a lawyer must articulate to
co-counsel how the defense is proceeding and why. The consultative
process would make the trial lawyer more deliberate. The settlement
lawyer can serve as a sounding board while also raising relevant
questions about the trial lawyer's strategy and course of action. The trial
lawyer can provide a comparable service to the settlement lawyer with
respect to negotiation strategy.
Fourth, the opportunity to consult with two lawyers who oversee each
other and offer independent perspectives would, for some clients,
promote client trust.37 Generally, making the lawyers responsible to
34. See generally Lindsay R. Goldstein, Note, A View From the Bench: Why Judges Fail
to Protect Trust and Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship-an Analysis and
Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665 (2005).
35. Jennifer Laurin, Data and Accountability in Indigent Defense, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 373 (2017).
36. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 197-200 (2012)
(maintaining that public defenders' offices achieve better results than appointed counsel
because they are not insular-that lawyers in a team are less error-prone and less likely to
erroneously assess the strength of a case, and more likely to keep up with new strategies
and changes in the law).
37. Criminal defendants' mistrust of their assigned counsel is a recurring theme in the
professional literature. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("It is no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers appointed to
represent them.").
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oversee each other would provide some assurance to the client that they
are providing diligent representation. In particular, where the trial
lawyer is proceeding in a reasonable fashion, the settlement lawyer's
meetings with the defendant, in which the settlement lawyer describes
and explains the trial lawyer's work, would bolster the defendant's
confidence in trial counsel.
Fifth, the division of responsibility would enable each lawyer to serve
in one role without some of the limitations that result from the other role.
In some jurisdictions, individual or institutional relationships between
defense lawyers and prosecutors are mistrustful or even hostile. 38 The
lack of cooperation can undermine criminal defendants' interests,
particularly in the plea bargaining context. Reducing antagonism may
benefit defendants, given the powerful role of the prosecutor's office in
the charging and plea bargaining process-a role that Judge Lynch has
likened to that of an administrative agency.3 9 Problem-solving courts
offer a model of a cooperative relationship between prosecutors and
defense lawyers that is generally thought to benefit defendants 40 but that
has not been replicated in ordinary criminal courts, where the lawyers
maintain adversarial roles.
The division of labor allows the respective defense lawyers to maintain
different relationships with the prosecutors. As a negotiator, settlement
counsel could cultivate a positive, cooperative, nonthreatening
relationship with prosecutors since settlement counsel would not be in
the antagonistic relationship with the prosecutor characterizing
adversarial relationships in criminal cases. Over time, settlement
counsel might socialize prosecutors, in the context of plea bargaining, to
themselves play a less adversarial role and a more judicial one. At the
same time, trial counsel-particularly those who serve exclusively in this
role-would be freer to conduct adjudicative proceedings aggressively,
with less fear that any resulting antagonism will disadvantage future
38. See, e.g., George E. Tragos, Prosecutors, Know Your Criminal Defense Lawyer, 29
STETSON L. REV. 199, 201-02 (1999) ("Unfortunately, a minority of prosecutors do not view
defense counsel as performing an ethical, necessary, and constitutional function. For those
prosecutors, the defense lawyer is the enemy-no better than the individual they defend,
and certainly a co-conspirator.").
39. See Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 9.
40. Problem solving courts, such as mental health and drug courts, seek to address the
problems giving rise to criminal conduct rather than to adjudicate criminal charges. See
Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1055, 1059-60 (2002). These courts typically require the cooperation of the judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorney to ensure defendants' compliance with treatment or
rehabilitation plans. See, e.g., Bobby Yu, The Case for Experimental Problem-Solving
Courts: Rehabilitation Through Behavioral Modification Programs, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 36,
40 (2013).
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clients. 41 This is not to say that lawyers conducting plea negotiations
should not be hard-hitting or that trial lawyers should be uncivil; 42 the
point is simply that each lawyer may be more effective if unshackled by
expectations or perceptions derived from the other's lawyering role.
Sixth, the division will focus lawyers individually and collectively on
the importance of their respective roles and provide advantages that
come with specialization. Currently, criminal defense lawyers, who
simultaneously serve as advisors, as plea negotiators, and as courtroom
advocates, may favor one role and give short shrift to another. Some
defense lawyers, whether because of excessive caseloads or because they
do not value counseling clients, fail to communicate regularly with
clients, keep them updated, and answer their questionS 43-despite an
ethical obligation to do so.44 Others do not perceive plea bargaining as a
skill and as a phase of a representation requiring planning, preparation,
and creativity, even though this is how most cases are resolved. 45 A
lawyer specifically assigned to advise the client, and if the client wishes,
to explore plea negotiations, would presumably place a higher value on
these functions.
41. For a discussion of punch-pulling by criminal defense lawyers-for example, a
reluctance to accuse prosecutors of misconduct-see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST
DEFENSE 390-95 (1982).
42. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A
Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 92 (1995) ("An arrogant or unnecessarily hostile
attitude is unlikely to redound to the client's benefit. Nevertheless, defense counsel cannot
allow her interest in maintaining a cordial relationship with a prosecutor to compromise
her representation of a client.").
43. See Berry, Bad Lawyering, supra note 11, at 490; Anthony Thompson, The Promise
of Gideon: Providing High-Quality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713,
721-22 (observing that in states providing counsel via contract or bidding systems, lawyers
often failed to meet regularly with their clients because "it was not in the lawyer's financial
interest" to do so and, as a result, the lawyers were "ill-prepared to represent their clients").
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983); see also Green,
supra note 33, at 1170 (observing that many criminal defense lawyers, due to inadequate
funding, fail to meet to comply their duty under Rule 1.4 to "keep clients 'reasonably
informed,' .. . 'comply with [their clients'] reasonable requests for information,'. . . consult
with clients about how the lawyer will pursue their objectives, and ... explain matters to
clients so that they can make 'informed decisions"').
45. See David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J.
2578, 2559 (2013) ("Today's defendant is typically better served by an attorney who is a
skilled counselor, negotiator, and mitigation investigator than by a great trial lawyer. Most
good defense work consists of marshaling mitigation evidence to more effectively beg
prosecutors for reduced charges and lower sentences, followed by effective client counseling
about the resulting offer and options."); Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer, supra note
42, at 74 ("[Dlespite the obvious importance of being good negotiators, criminal defense
lawyers often do not bargain effectively.").
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Moreover, effective counselors and negotiators need different skills
from effective trial lawyers. There is extensive literature on trial skills,
including in the criminal context. Trial skills garner more attention
because of the publicly visible and formalized nature of criminal trials
and the tradition of a trial as the means by which criminal cases were
expected to be resolved. Comparatively little attention is devoted to
studying and explicating the counseling and negotiation roles, which are
largely hidden from view, and to training criminal defense lawyers to
serve these functions thoughtfully and effectively. 46 The division of
functions would encourage the criminal defense bar to place equal
emphasis on preparing lawyers to serve in these less visible roles.
Seventh, the division of responsibilities may lead to improvements in
the procedural law and practice. Currently, the law regulating the work
of would-be settlement lawyers is not well developed. 47 Viewing
counseling and negotiating as a criminal defense function worthy of equal
dignity may lead the criminal defense bar to adopt more demanding
guidelines for practice and to become more innovative in litigating in
these areas in order to promote the development of procedural law in
directions helpful to their clientele.48 At the very least, as the profession
adopts greater expectations for criminal defense lawyers engaged in
counseling and plea negotiations, courts can be expected to enforce
higher standards under the Strickland test governing the Sixth
Amendment right to competent representation, since the constitutional
requirement of "reasonableness" depends in part on the prevailing
standards of practice. 49 Further, defense lawyers specializing in
negotiations may demand more of themselves and of the prosecution in
ways that influence practice, if not the law itself, thereby bringing the
46. Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1445, 1448 (2016) ("[P]lea bargaining is an underappreciated skill, particularly given
its central role in the criminal justice system."); Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer,
supra note 42, at 73-74 (noting that although the vast majority of criminal cases are
resolved through plea negotiations, very few lawyers are formally trained to negotiate
effectively).
47. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2674
(2013) ("[M]uch remains to be done to give true content to the meaning of effective plea
bargaining counsel.").
48. For writings proposing stronger procedural protections in the plea bargaining
context, see Joel Mallord, Putting Plea Bargaining On the Record, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 683,
685 (2014) (advocating that the criminal defense bar adopt a practice of recording the plea
bargaining process in order to better protect defendants' Sixth Amendment rights).
49. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("Prevailing norms of practice . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable.").
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reality closer to the ideal expressed in Judge Lynch's concept of an
"administrative system of justice."5 0
Eighth, the division of labor may expand the pool of lawyers interested
in criminal defense by attracting those interested in concentrating, at
least for a time, on one function but not the other. Of course, criminal
defense lawyers could divide their time, serving in some cases as
settlement counsel and in other cases as trial counsel. But they would
not have to do so. Those who have an affinity or talent for one function
but not both could focus on just one aspect of criminal defense, and those
who specialize would have greater opportunity to develop expertise in the
chosen area.
To be sure, it is important that each lawyer in a representation have
a good understanding of the other's work-that the settlement lawyer be
in a position to evaluate the work of the trial lawyer and the trial lawyer
understand the implications of pretrial investigation and preparation for
counseling and plea bargaining. That does not necessarily mean each
lawyer must perform both roles either in a particular case or in general.
It also does not mean lawyers are adept in each of these roles; indeed, it
seems implausible to expect many lawyers to be adept at counseling,
negotiating, and advocacy, given the different skills on which these
functions draw.
IV. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS
Of course, many will regard this Article's proposal as unrealistic if not
fanciful. The constitutional right of indigent defendants to be appointed
even one criminal defense lawyer took long enough to be recognized,5 1 is
still not applicable to all criminal proceedings, 52 and often is not given
full effect. 53 It is unrealistic to expect a court or legislature to establish a
routine right to a pair of criminal defense lawyers or to expect public
defenders' offices voluntarily to assign two lawyers to each client.
50. See Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 9.
51. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
52. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (ruling that indigent defendants have
no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases when they do not
face a risk of imprisonment).
53. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013) ("Every day in thousands of
courtrooms across the nation . . [j]udges conduct hearings in which poor people accused of
crimes and poor children charged with acts of delinquency appear without lawyers. Many
plead guilty without lawyers. Others plead guilty and are sentenced after learning about
plea offers from lawyers they met moments before and will never see again."); Taylor-
Thompson, Turning Up Gideon's Trumpet, supra note 21 (discussing case law's failure to
ensure quality defense).
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The principal anticipated objections would be financial and
administrative. Having two lawyers will likely cost more because the
lawyers would spend more time in the aggregate on any given
defendant's representation. That is precisely the objective: to motivate
the lawyers to undertake necessary tasks more diligently than criminal
defense lawyers customarily now do and to insulate them from pressures
to give the representation short shrift.
There may also be inefficiencies. The lawyers will have to
communicate information to each other that, at present, a lawyer
conducting the representation alone would know. The lawyers may
occasionally appear together in court. They may engage in duplicative
conversations with the defendant (although the benefits of giving
defendants the opportunity to communicate with counsel more
frequently, to receive different legal perspectives on the case, and to
receive explanations in a different manner, might compensate for any
duplication). Further, it would take more time for courts or other entities
to administer a system in which each indigent defendant is assigned two
different lawyers, preferably from different law offices.
Given the routine nature of co-counsel relationships in other contexts,
one might be skeptical of whether appointing two lawyers is necessarily
inefficient rather than just more expensive. As discussed above in Part
III, any additional expense may go to purchasing better advice,
negotiation, and trial work. Even so, one would have to assess whether
the presumed benefits to the criminal defendant and to the public would
justify the greater cost.
Even if two lawyers would substantially and demonstrably improve
the quality of criminal defense, making the criminal process fairer and
more reliable, states would predictably resist because they do not value
this objective. In many states and localities, quality defense is not a
priority worthy of any higher cost; the objective seems to be to spend as
little money as the courts let them.54 In some jurisdictions, defendants in
death-penalty cases are currently assigned two lawyers because of the
high stakes and the heightened need for a fair and reliable outcome,55
54. Bright & Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance, supra note 53, at 2153 ("[M]ost states,
counties, and municipalities-responsible for over ninety-five percent of all criminal
prosecutions-have refused to provide funding necessary for counsel and equal justice,
despite repeated reports of deficient representation and gross miscarriages of justice. There
is no public support for such funding, and governments have no incentive to provide
competent representation, which could frustrate their efforts to convict, fine, imprison, and
execute poor defendants.").
55. Some state laws expressly provide for the appointment of two lawyers in death
penalty cases, one of whom will serve as lead counsel, and in other states, although not
expressly required, the appointment of two lawyers appears to be the general practice. See
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but other jurisdictions balk even at that. 56 It would be hard to convince
any public official or agency that the greater expense of two lawyers is
justified in garden-variety criminal cases.
Even apart from the drain on resources, some might question whether
the division of labor between two appointed lawyers would improve
indigent criminal defense. One might worry, for example, that in place of
one unmotivated, overworked lawyer who spends inadequate time on the
representation, the defendant will be assigned two unmotivated,
overworked lawyers who in the aggregate spend as little time on each
representation and who individually spend proportionately less time on
the representation. That would replicate the problem inherent in some
public defenders' offices where different lawyers represent the defendant
at different stages or in different courtrooms with the result that it is
even harder than usual to develop a relationship of trust with assigned
counsel.5 7 If so-if the collegiality, accountability, and other potential
advantages of the proposed two-lawyer system do not improve the quality
of indigent defense-it will be time to move onto another innovation.
There may also be difficulties of coordination between the two lawyers
that would reduce the overall quality of the defense. Tasks might fall
through the cracks as each lawyer expects the other to perform them.
Information might not be communicated effectively, or a lawyer may be
hampered by having received information second-hand. Of course, these
concerns might appear to be makeweight since, as noted earlier, lawyers
commonly work collaboratively in litigation. But the ordinary model is
probably one where a single lawyer is in charge and others answer to that
lawyer. A division of responsibility between co-equals may pose
challenges that lawyers lack experience resolving. As a system of dual
lawyers is institutionalized, the criminal defense bar may become more
practiced in addressing some of these challenges, but perhaps some will
prove too difficult to resolve.
The ability to achieve some presumed benefits of bifurcation might
also be jeopardized by the possibility of cooption. The lawyers may care
more about each other than about the defendant. The relationship
Indigent Defense State Links, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/topics/
access-and-fairness/indigent-defense/state-links.aspx?cat=Capital%20Case%2ORepresent
ation (last visited Feb. 5, 2018); see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 952
(2003).
56. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (2000).
57. See, e.g., Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional
Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 473, 484-85 (identifying
"stage representation," in which defendants have different lawyers at different stages of a
criminal prosecution, as an impediment to developing client trust).
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between settlement and trial lawyers may be strong, since they are
members of the same profession, may serve as co-counsel on a regular
basis, and may have a mutual interest in overlooking each other's
failings. To the extent that the lawyers are expected to oversee each
other, collegiality may present a strong disincentive to doing so. This may
or may not be outweighed by the lawyers' concern for the client, sense of
professionalism, reputational self-interest, or personal pride in the
quality of their own and the collective representation.
Further, one might worry that instead of attracting more lawyers to
criminal defense, specialization will discourage interest in this line of
work. While some criminal defense lawyers may prefer to specialize in
either trial work or in counseling and negotiation, other (and maybe
more) lawyers may see combining functions in each representation as
important to their conception of criminal defense. They may find it
unappealing to serve only one role at a time or, even more so, to have to
monitor their co-counsel and have their co-counsel looking over their
shoulder. Moreover, dividing these functions, as an admitted response to
current deficiencies in criminal defense representation, may lower the
status of indigent criminal defense lawyers, who historically have not
enjoyed a high status in the bar to begin with.5 8
One can equally speculate that lawyers wilt appreciate working with
co-counsel rather than alone, seeing how others perform their work, and
receiving encouragement and feedback intended to improve their
performance. If co-counsel develop strong working relationships, as they
have an interest in doing, the distinctions between their roles may
become more fluid-allowing the settlement lawyer to take a role in
investigation and advocacy, and calling on the trial lawyer to participate
in counseling and negotiating-in ways that enhance the overall quality
of the defense. Particularly for inexperienced lawyers, the opportunity
for collaboration and for a more narrowly defined role may make criminal
defense less daunting, and therefore more appealing.
Finally, experience raises further doubt about the utility of having two
lawyers, given contemporary practice outside indigent defense: clients do
58. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an
Unreasonable Price? Limitations onAttorneys'Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 51
n.254 (1999); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the
21st Century, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 86, 94 (1995) ("Public defenders are often viewed
by the public as either incompetent at what they do or immoral for doing it."); Thompson,
The Promise of Gideon, supra note 43, at 729 ("In considering what makes an excellent
indigent defense system, the first step is to dispel myths about who chooses to engage in
the work. Contrary to popular views, the average public defender is not someone who ends
up representing indigent clients because she 'could not get a better job in the private
sector."').
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not routinely retain lawyers to serve the separate settlement and trial
functions in litigation even when they can afford to do so. To be sure, as
previously noted, clients often do retain multiple lawyers to work on their
cases, sometimes within a single law firm but sometimes from different
firms or offices. And, to a large extent, co-counsel often serve different
functions or contribute different types of expertise to the overall
representation. But it is certainly not the prevailing practice, where
lawyers are privately retained, to divide the settlement and negotiation
function from the trial function.5 9 One might question whether the
problems of indigent criminal defense are so different that the bifurcation
of legal functions should be the norm in this context when it is not widely
employed in other contexts.
The answer, this Article argues, is that the problems of indigent
criminal defense are so different. As discussed in Part III, this Article's
proposed division of labor between two lawyers in the indigent defense
context addresses a host of problems generally nonexistent in other
representational contexts. The proposal, if pursued, may ultimately
prove to be a failure. But the accumulated problems, which many
perceive to add up to a "crisis" in criminal defense, means that something
different is needed.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT'S THE POINT OF IMAGINING?
The right to two lawyers will not be recognized by courts or legislators
any time soon. But private foundations could fund defenders' offices to
adopt the idea on an experimental basis and to study it. Do co-counsel
serving different functions lead to better outcomes or greater client (or
lawyer) satisfaction or improve on current criminal defense practices by
some other measure, or are they no better or even worse than the status
quo? Does structuring criminal defense in this way cost significantly
more, and if so, are the costs reasonable in relationship to whatever
benefits are derived? These questions can be studied and answered.
To the extent the proposal is not taken seriously as an avenue of
immediate reform, it should at least be considered as a construct-a lens
through which to examine indigent criminal defense. At the very least,
the idea might encourage participants in, and commentators on, the
59. In civil litigation, the relatively infrequent use of settlement counsel may be
explained in part by litigants' concern that opposing parties will perceive the retention of
separate settlement counsel as an expression of weakness-an implied concession that the
party is afraid to go to trial. That would not be a problem in indigent criminal cases,
however, both because criminal cases are not expected to go to trial and because the
institutionalization of settlement counsel would not reflect any judgment on the defendant's
part.
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criminal defense process to look differently at the challenges of indigent
criminal defense and to think differently about the possible responses. It
might also serve as a reminder of the gap-indeed chasm-between our
constitutional aspirations and the present-day reality of indigent defense
in many jurisdictions. And the idea of two lawyers might offer individual
criminal defense lawyers a different way of thinking about their work, its
challenges, and, particularly, the importance of serving all of their
functions-counseling, negotiating, and advocacy-with devotion and
consideration.
There is a tendency to think that the root of all indigent criminal
defense problems is underfunding and that money will solve all problems.
But that may be overstated.60 Better funding would surely be a big help,
but some problems of criminal defense might be addressed in other
ways. 61 Some could not be solved by money alone. Wholly apart from
resources, some defense lawyers are uncommitted or burnt out, poorly
trained, inattentive, or simply incapable. While it is presumed that many
clients, especially sophisticated clients, can regulate their lawyers' work,
indigent criminal defendants ordinarily cannot do so and, in any event,
cannot choose or replace their lawyers. And other regulatory mechanisms
are almost equally inadequate to ensure the quality of criminal defense.
Moreover, some problems may be caused by tensions in criminal
defense practice that are structural and unrelated to resources. For
example, criminal defense lawyers, driven by adversarial zeal, may
disserve their clients by failing to develop cooperative relationships with
prosecutors in the plea bargaining context; conversely, they may pull
their punches in the trial context out of concern for future relationships
with a prosecutor's office with which they will plea bargain most cases.
Criminal defense lawyers may ignore the challenges of counseling and
negotiating, and fail to develop their skills in these areas out of a
traditional preference for trial work; conversely, they may give
inadequate attention to trial work either because they know that most
cases will "plead out" or because of their self-interest in resolving cases
by guilty plea.
These are problems with how some defense lawyers think about and
structure their work; with where they choose to direct their energy and
how they prioritize their time; with how they respond to incentives,
60. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Law and Market: State Incentives, Plea Bargaining
Regulation, and the Failed Market for Indigent Defense, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 95
(2017) ("Resource and caseload burdens provide only a partial explanation for the failure of
indigent defense.").
61. See, e.g., Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1057, 1061-64 (2015) (advocating for the development of data-driven system
approach to public defense in order to improve the delivery of indigent defense services).
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preferences, and even unconscious motivations; and with how they relate
to prosecutors, clients, or others in the criminal process. Starting one's
analysis with a proposed solution, however unrealistic-in this case, a
right to two lawyers-may provide a new way to think about problems
such as these. And perhaps one day, new thinking may lead to changes
that realistically can be implemented to "disrupt" the indigent defense
process for the better.
